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A chaos-based image encryption algorithm was proposed in [Z.-H. Guan, F. Huang, W. Guan, Phys. Lett. A
346 (2005) 153]. In this Letter, we analyze the security weaknesses of the proposal. By applying chosen-
plaintext and known-plaintext attacks, we show that all the secret parameters can be revealed.
© 2009 Published by Elsevier B.V.
1. Introduction
In this Letter, we give a complete break of the chaos-based
image encryption algorithm proposed in [1]. The algorithm uses
Arnold’s cat map [2] to shuffle the image pixels and Chen’s chaotic
system [3] to change the gray levels of the shuffled image pixels.
The outline of the Letter is as follows. In the next section
we describe the encryption algorithm in detail. In Section 3, we
demonstrate a chosen-plaintext attack that reveals all the secret
parameters. In Section 4, we do the same with a known-plaintext
attack. In Section 5, we illustrate the success of our break with
simulation examples. Finally, we give concluding remarks.
2. Description of the encryption algorithm
The encryption process consists of two parts. In the first part,
the algorithm takes an image P and shuffles its pixels using Arnold
cat map. The second part of the algorithm changes the gray levels
of the pixels using Chen’s chaotic system.
2.1. Arnold cat map
Assume that we have an N × N image P with the pixel coordi-
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where p, q are positive integers and x′ , y′ are the coordinate values





















= An mod N.
The shuffled image S is related to the original image P as
S(x′, y′) = P (x, y), 0  x, y  N − 1.
2.2. Chen’s chaotic system
Chen’s chaotic system is a set of differential equations given as
ẋ = a(y − x),
ẏ = (c − a)x − xz + cy,
ż = xy − bz, (3)
where a, b and c are parameters of the system. Chen’s system is
chaotic when the parameters have the values; a = 35, b = 3 and
c ∈ [20,28.4] [1].
2.3. Encryption algorithm
In this section, we describe the encryption algorithm in detail.
The secret keys of the algorithm are the parameters p, q, n of
Arnold cat map and the initial values x0, y0, z0 of Chen’s chaotic
system. The encryption steps are as follows:
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(1) Shuffle the image P using Arnold cat map and obtain the shuf-
fled image S .
(2) By scanning the image S row-by-row, arrange its pixels as the
sequence S = {s1, s2, . . . , sN×N}.
(3) Using Runge–Kutta step size 0.001, iterate Chen’s chaotic sys-
tem N0 = (N × N)/3 times and obtain the real values xi , yi , zi ,
1  i  N0.
(4) Obtain the key sequence K = {k1,k2, . . . ,kN×N } as
k3(i−1)+1 =
∣∣xi − xi∣∣ × 1014 mod 256,
k3(i−1)+2 =
∣∣yi − yi∣∣ × 1014 mod 256,
k3(i−1)+3 =
∣∣zi − zi∣∣ × 1014 mod 256, (4)
where x denotes the largest integer not larger than x. Here,
we assume that the encryption setup represents the real num-
bers with 14 decimal digits after the point.
(5) Obtain the encrypted sequence C = {c1, c2, . . . , cN×N} as
ci = si ⊕ ki, 1  i  N × N, (5)
where ⊕ represents bitwise exclusive OR operation.
(6) By reshaping the sequence C into an N × N image, obtain the
ciphertext image.
3. Chosen-plaintext attack
In this section, we describe how the secret parameters of the
proposed encryption algorithm can be extracted using a chosen-
plaintext attack.
If an attacker knows the parameters M and K , he can reverse
the two steps of the encryption and decrypt a ciphertext image.
Indeed, if an attacker knows K , by using (5), he can obtain the
shuffled image S . If he also knows M , he uses (2) and obtains the
original image P . Thus, there are only two secret parameters to
extract and these are M and K . The attack consists of two steps.
First, K is recovered. Then, the attacker uses K in calculating the
key M of Arnold cat map.
3.1. Extracting K
The attacker choses an image P1 that consists of N × N zero-
valued pixels, and obtains the corresponding ciphertext image, C1.
The shuffling process does not change the image because P1
is identically 0. Hence, the shuffled image S1 is equal to the im-
age P1. Using this fact and (5), the attacker can easily see that the
cipher-image C1 is exactly equal to the key K as
C1 = S1 ⊕ K = P1 ⊕ K = 0 ⊕ K = K .
3.2. Extracting M
The attacker choses another image P2 and gets the corre-
sponding ciphertext image C2. The image P2 is chosen such that
it contains only two non-zero and distinct pixels P2(1,1) = v1,
P2(1,2) = v2 so that v1 = v2 and v1,2 = 0. The attacker already
knows K . By using (5), the attacker obtains the corresponding
shuffled image S2 from C2 as
S2 = C2 ⊕ K .
Now, the attacker has the image P2 and the corresponding
shuffled image S2. By searching for pixel values v1, v2 in S2, the
attacker determines the shuffled coordinates (x′1, y′1) and (x′2, y′2).



























Solving these equations, the attacker finds that m2 = x′2 −
x′1 mod N , m1 = x′1 − m2 mod N , m4 = y′2 − y′1 mod N , m3 = y′1 −
m4 mod N . Hence, the key M is extracted. Now, the attacker has all
the secret parameters of the encryption algorithm.
4. Known-plaintext attack
In this section, we describe how the secret parameters of the
proposed encryption algorithm can be extracted using a known
plaintext attack. In this case, the attacker does not choose plain-
texts. Instead, we assume that he has obtained some plaintext–
ciphertext pairs. The attack consists of two steps; the first step is
to calculate the key of Arnold cat map, M , and the second step is
to extract the key K of Chen’s chaotic system.
4.1. Extracting M
Assume that the attacker knows two plaintext–ciphertext image
pairs (P1, C1) and (P2, C2). Let us define the differences as P =
P1 ⊕ P2 and C = C1 ⊕ C2. Using (5), the attacker calculates
C = S1 ⊕ K ⊕ S2 ⊕ K = S1 ⊕ S2 = S
Hence, the attacker can calculate S . Going from P to S ,
there is only shuffling by the Arnold cat map. Next, we give
a method to reveal the parameters of this map.
Let P (x1, y1) = v1, P (x2, y2) = v2 be two pixels of P with
different values, i.e. v1 = v2. Let (x′1, y′1) and (x′2, y′2) denote their










U mod N, (7)
where U = [ x1 x2y1 y2
]
.




(i, j) | S(i, j) = v1
}
. (8)
Similarly, define the set V 2 as
V 2 =
{
(k, l) | S(k, l) = v2
}
. (9)








∣∣∣ (i, j) ∈ V 1, (k, l) ∈ V 2
}
. (10)
By the definitions of the sets V 1 and V 2, we have (x′1, y′1) ∈ V 1
and (x′2, y′2) ∈ V 2. So, using (7), we conclude that M ∈ V .
Thus, once the attacker constructs the set V , he has |V | =
|V 1||V 2| candidates for M . Repeating the procedure with another
pair of pixels P (x̄1, ȳ1) = v̄1, P (x̄2, ȳ2) = v̄2, v̄1 = v̄2, he finds
another set V̄ that contains M . Obviously,
M ∈ V ∩ V̄ . (11)
Continuing in this fashion, he intersect more and more sets
until the intersection contains only one element. This element is
necessarily M .
In order to make the set V of candidates smaller, the attacker
chooses rare pixel pairs in P .
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4.2. Extracting K
The attacker knows the image P1 and the corresponding cipher
image C1. Using (2) and the Arnold cat map parameter M revealed
in the previous step, the attacker calculates S1.
Using S1 in (5), the attacker obtains Chen’s chaotic system pa-
rameter K as
K = C1 ⊕ S1.
Thus, the attacker knows all the secret parameters of the en-
cryption algorithm.
5. Simulation results
In order to illustrate each type of attacks, we give simulation re-
sults for two cases. Simulations are performed under MATLAB run-
ning on Mac OS X 10.5.4 with Intel Core 2 Duo 2.16 GHz processor
and 2 GB RAM. The secret parameters are chosen from the example
in [1]. Arnold cat map parameters are: p = 1, q = 1, n = 5, Chen’s
chaotic system parameters are: a = 35, b = 3, c = 28, The initial
conditions for the Chen system are: x0 = −10.058, y0 = 0.368,
z0 = 37.368.
In the first simulation, we illustrate the chosen-plaintext attack.




0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0







0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0




Note that the first image consists of zero valued pixels and the








The ciphertext C1, which is also the Chen key K , is given as
C1 = K =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
255 0 0 210 15 170 32 187 27
225 138 115 22 29 95 140 62 213
152 97 255 222 66 34 164 1 148
225 142 38 133 203 253 201 115 133
70 223 18 151 239 179 137 251 101
64 67 157 22 225 39 70 171 25
83 19 3 209 152 89 121 220 249
87 170 185 30 240 74 47 173 43




Fig. 1. (a) Plaintext P1; (b) Plaintext P2; (c) P ; (d) C .
Fig. 2. Chen key K .





0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
Inspecting S2, the attacker finds that x′1 = 8, y′1 = 0, x′2 = 0,
y′2 = 8. Substituting these into (6), the attacker finds M .
In the second simulation, we illustrate the known-plaintext at-
tack. Assume that the attacker knows the two 256 × 256 plaintext
images in Fig. 1(a) and 1(b). The difference images P = P1 ⊕ P2
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The two rarest pixel values in P are v1 = 131 and v2 = 140.
Following are procedure in Section 4.1, we find 25718 candidates
for M . Next rarest pair of pixel values are v̄1 = 140 and v̄2 = 120.
This time, there are 29058 candidates. Intersecting the two sets of
candidates, we find only one candidate. The attack takes less than
one minute.
Finally, after calculating S1 using (2), the attacker reveals K as
K = C1 ⊕ S1. K is given in Fig. 2.
6. Conclusion
In this Letter, we gave a complete break of a chaos-based image
encryption algorithm. We demonstrated that the secret keys can be
revealed using chosen and known plaintext attacks.
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